Thesis ideas

I think this is blogworthy — I’m getting my ideas together for my honors thesis and have four general ideas. This is an edited version of an email I sent to my soon-to-be advisor:

• I’m very interested in comparing dispute resolution mechanisms between parties. I’ve been fairly interested in international courts (especially the ICJ), but I understand that most treaties incorporate less institutional mechanisms (arbitration, referals to higher authorities, etc.). I would be interested to find the factors that predict parties’ initial preferences for dispute resolution system, although I admit I haven’t got any sources right now to cite in my hypothesis. This is actually the question I’ve done the least preliminary research on.
• I’m also interested in indications of power relationships in rationally designed agreements. Bilateral treaties between a dominant and a less powerful state are almost sure to reflect that asymmetry of power. How does this occur in multilateral treaties, and how does the rational design paradigm explain it? Do powerful states team up to ensure that they collectively negotiate favorable terms relative to less powerful states as a whole? Can one powerful state, acting in its interest, block another powerful state from creating such a power relationship? I’m interested in how these, I guess I’d call them “systematized” relationships help or hinder multilateral treaty laws’ effectiveness and likelihood of ratification.
• Implementation as a reaction to rational design. This is what I was trying to say this morning, but I was thinking more of selective enforcement at the time. Literature exists to show that signing-but-not-implementing is a unique response, separate from not signing and fully complying. I think I could design a study to predict that response based on the occurence of certain features in a rationally designed agreement. This area’s crowded, though. I really like Jana von Stein’s method, but this topic would need some definite refinement before I’d dare start on it, even if it is valid. (I’m interested in putting into the same rational design frame the idea of external, extra-legal force: can/do treatymakers unofficially acknowledge hegemons’ willingness to enforce treaties themselves (as is the case with the US and Iran over and above the IAEA)? Does leaving the door open to hegemonic pressures count as rational design?)
• What features account for the differences in the US and EU’s (and others’?) handling of various international/regional courts and tribunals? This really interests me. I’m curious not only about the design and implementation, but in going deeper into the motivations of each actor — who originally advocated the institution, what were their original preferences going into negotiations, etc. The way I’m thinking of it, the project would be multilevel comparative, which could make for some complicated statistical work, but I’m up for if necessary. Again, as it stands this is really broad, but it’s something that’s interested me for a while now.

If I had to choose, I’d say I’m most interested at the moment in the extralegal power question in my third bullet. That’s likely just because it came to me in a flash after reading this Opinio Juris post last night. Might just be a passing phase, and anyway, how would I test that?